| /* |
| * Common NFSv4 ACL handling code. |
| * |
| * Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The Regents of the University of Michigan. |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Marius Aamodt Eriksen <marius@umich.edu> |
| * Jeff Sedlak <jsedlak@umich.edu> |
| * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu> |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its |
| * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived |
| * from this software without specific prior written permission. |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED |
| * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE |
| * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR |
| * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF |
| * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR |
| * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF |
| * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING |
| * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS |
| * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/nfs_fs.h> |
| #include <linux/export.h> |
| #include "nfsfh.h" |
| #include "nfsd.h" |
| #include "acl.h" |
| #include "vfs.h" |
| |
| #define NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT 0x01 |
| #define NFS4_ACL_DIR 0x02 |
| #define NFS4_ACL_OWNER 0x04 |
| |
| /* mode bit translations: */ |
| #define NFS4_READ_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_DATA) |
| #define NFS4_WRITE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_DATA | NFS4_ACE_APPEND_DATA) |
| #define NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE NFS4_ACE_EXECUTE |
| #define NFS4_ANYONE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL | NFS4_ACE_SYNCHRONIZE) |
| #define NFS4_OWNER_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL) |
| |
| /* We don't support these bits; insist they be neither allowed nor denied */ |
| #define NFS4_MASK_UNSUPP (NFS4_ACE_DELETE | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_OWNER \ |
| | NFS4_ACE_READ_NAMED_ATTRS | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS) |
| |
| /* flags used to simulate posix default ACLs */ |
| #define NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS (NFS4_ACE_FILE_INHERIT_ACE \ |
| | NFS4_ACE_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE) |
| |
| #define NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS (NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS \ |
| | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE \ |
| | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP) |
| |
| #define MASK_EQUAL(mask1, mask2) \ |
| ( ((mask1) & NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL) == ((mask2) & NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL) ) |
| |
| static u32 |
| mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| int mask = NFS4_ANYONE_MODE; |
| |
| if (flags & NFS4_ACL_OWNER) |
| mask |= NFS4_OWNER_MODE; |
| if (perm & ACL_READ) |
| mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE; |
| if (perm & ACL_WRITE) |
| mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE; |
| if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)) |
| mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD; |
| if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE) |
| mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE; |
| return mask; |
| } |
| |
| static u32 |
| deny_mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, u32 flags) |
| { |
| u32 mask = 0; |
| |
| if (perm & ACL_READ) |
| mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE; |
| if (perm & ACL_WRITE) |
| mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE; |
| if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)) |
| mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD; |
| if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE) |
| mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE; |
| return mask; |
| } |
| |
| /* XXX: modify functions to return NFS errors; they're only ever |
| * used by nfs code, after all.... */ |
| |
| /* We only map from NFSv4 to POSIX ACLs when setting ACLs, when we err on the |
| * side of being more restrictive, so the mode bit mapping below is |
| * pessimistic. An optimistic version would be needed to handle DENY's, |
| * but we espect to coalesce all ALLOWs and DENYs before mapping to mode |
| * bits. */ |
| |
| static void |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(u32 perm, unsigned short *mode, unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| u32 write_mode = NFS4_WRITE_MODE; |
| |
| if (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR) |
| write_mode |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD; |
| *mode = 0; |
| if ((perm & NFS4_READ_MODE) == NFS4_READ_MODE) |
| *mode |= ACL_READ; |
| if ((perm & write_mode) == write_mode) |
| *mode |= ACL_WRITE; |
| if ((perm & NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) == NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) |
| *mode |= ACL_EXECUTE; |
| } |
| |
| struct ace_container { |
| struct nfs4_ace *ace; |
| struct list_head ace_l; |
| }; |
| |
| static short ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *); |
| static void _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *, struct nfs4_acl *, |
| unsigned int); |
| |
| int |
| nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry, |
| struct nfs4_acl **acl) |
| { |
| struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
| int error = 0; |
| struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL; |
| unsigned int flags = 0; |
| int size = 0; |
| |
| pacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); |
| if (!pacl) { |
| pacl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (IS_ERR(pacl)) |
| return PTR_ERR(pacl); |
| } |
| /* allocate for worst case: one (deny, allow) pair each: */ |
| size += 2 * pacl->a_count; |
| |
| if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { |
| flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR; |
| dpacl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); |
| if (dpacl) |
| size += 2 * dpacl->a_count; |
| } |
| |
| *acl = nfs4_acl_new(size); |
| if (*acl == NULL) { |
| error = -ENOMEM; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| _posix_to_nfsv4_one(pacl, *acl, flags & ~NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); |
| |
| if (dpacl) |
| _posix_to_nfsv4_one(dpacl, *acl, flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); |
| |
| out: |
| posix_acl_release(pacl); |
| posix_acl_release(dpacl); |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| struct posix_acl_summary { |
| unsigned short owner; |
| unsigned short users; |
| unsigned short group; |
| unsigned short groups; |
| unsigned short other; |
| unsigned short mask; |
| }; |
| |
| static void |
| summarize_posix_acl(struct posix_acl *acl, struct posix_acl_summary *pas) |
| { |
| struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; |
| |
| /* |
| * Only pas.users and pas.groups need initialization; previous |
| * posix_acl_valid() calls ensure that the other fields will be |
| * initialized in the following loop. But, just to placate gcc: |
| */ |
| memset(pas, 0, sizeof(*pas)); |
| pas->mask = 07; |
| |
| pe = acl->a_entries + acl->a_count; |
| |
| FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { |
| switch (pa->e_tag) { |
| case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| pas->owner = pa->e_perm; |
| break; |
| case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| pas->group = pa->e_perm; |
| break; |
| case ACL_USER: |
| pas->users |= pa->e_perm; |
| break; |
| case ACL_GROUP: |
| pas->groups |= pa->e_perm; |
| break; |
| case ACL_OTHER: |
| pas->other = pa->e_perm; |
| break; |
| case ACL_MASK: |
| pas->mask = pa->e_perm; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| /* We'll only care about effective permissions: */ |
| pas->users &= pas->mask; |
| pas->group &= pas->mask; |
| pas->groups &= pas->mask; |
| } |
| |
| /* We assume the acl has been verified with posix_acl_valid. */ |
| static void |
| _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct nfs4_acl *acl, |
| unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *group_owner_entry; |
| struct nfs4_ace *ace; |
| struct posix_acl_summary pas; |
| unsigned short deny; |
| int eflag = ((flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) ? |
| NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE : 0); |
| |
| BUG_ON(pacl->a_count < 3); |
| summarize_posix_acl(pacl, &pas); |
| |
| pa = pacl->a_entries; |
| ace = acl->aces + acl->naces; |
| |
| /* We could deny everything not granted by the owner: */ |
| deny = ~pas.owner; |
| /* |
| * but it is equivalent (and simpler) to deny only what is not |
| * granted by later entries: |
| */ |
| deny &= pas.users | pas.group | pas.groups | pas.other; |
| if (deny) { |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| } |
| |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags | NFS4_ACL_OWNER); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| pa++; |
| |
| while (pa->e_tag == ACL_USER) { |
| deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask); |
| deny &= pas.groups | pas.group | pas.other; |
| if (deny) { |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; |
| ace->who_uid = pa->e_uid; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| } |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask, |
| flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; |
| ace->who_uid = pa->e_uid; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| pa++; |
| } |
| |
| /* In the case of groups, we apply allow ACEs first, then deny ACEs, |
| * since a user can be in more than one group. */ |
| |
| /* allow ACEs */ |
| |
| group_owner_entry = pa; |
| |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pas.group, flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| pa++; |
| |
| while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) { |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP; |
| ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask, |
| flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; |
| ace->who_gid = pa->e_gid; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| pa++; |
| } |
| |
| /* deny ACEs */ |
| |
| pa = group_owner_entry; |
| |
| deny = ~pas.group & pas.other; |
| if (deny) { |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| } |
| pa++; |
| |
| while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) { |
| deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask); |
| deny &= pas.other; |
| if (deny) { |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP; |
| ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; |
| ace->who_gid = pa->e_gid; |
| ace++; |
| acl->naces++; |
| } |
| pa++; |
| } |
| |
| if (pa->e_tag == ACL_MASK) |
| pa++; |
| ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; |
| ace->flag = eflag; |
| ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags); |
| ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE; |
| acl->naces++; |
| } |
| |
| static bool |
| pace_gt(struct posix_acl_entry *pace1, struct posix_acl_entry *pace2) |
| { |
| if (pace1->e_tag != pace2->e_tag) |
| return pace1->e_tag > pace2->e_tag; |
| if (pace1->e_tag == ACL_USER) |
| return uid_gt(pace1->e_uid, pace2->e_uid); |
| if (pace1->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) |
| return gid_gt(pace1->e_gid, pace2->e_gid); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| sort_pacl_range(struct posix_acl *pacl, int start, int end) { |
| int sorted = 0, i; |
| struct posix_acl_entry tmp; |
| |
| /* We just do a bubble sort; easy to do in place, and we're not |
| * expecting acl's to be long enough to justify anything more. */ |
| while (!sorted) { |
| sorted = 1; |
| for (i = start; i < end; i++) { |
| if (pace_gt(&pacl->a_entries[i], |
| &pacl->a_entries[i+1])) { |
| sorted = 0; |
| tmp = pacl->a_entries[i]; |
| pacl->a_entries[i] = pacl->a_entries[i+1]; |
| pacl->a_entries[i+1] = tmp; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| sort_pacl(struct posix_acl *pacl) |
| { |
| /* posix_acl_valid requires that users and groups be in order |
| * by uid/gid. */ |
| int i, j; |
| |
| /* no users or groups */ |
| if (!pacl || pacl->a_count <= 4) |
| return; |
| |
| i = 1; |
| while (pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag == ACL_USER) |
| i++; |
| sort_pacl_range(pacl, 1, i-1); |
| |
| BUG_ON(pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag != ACL_GROUP_OBJ); |
| j = ++i; |
| while (pacl->a_entries[j].e_tag == ACL_GROUP) |
| j++; |
| sort_pacl_range(pacl, i, j-1); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains bitmasks representing |
| * which permission bits have been allowed and which denied to a given |
| * entity: */ |
| struct posix_ace_state { |
| u32 allow; |
| u32 deny; |
| }; |
| |
| struct posix_user_ace_state { |
| union { |
| kuid_t uid; |
| kgid_t gid; |
| }; |
| struct posix_ace_state perms; |
| }; |
| |
| struct posix_ace_state_array { |
| int n; |
| struct posix_user_ace_state aces[]; |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains the partial permissions |
| * calculated so far: */ |
| |
| struct posix_acl_state { |
| int empty; |
| struct posix_ace_state owner; |
| struct posix_ace_state group; |
| struct posix_ace_state other; |
| struct posix_ace_state everyone; |
| struct posix_ace_state mask; /* Deny unused in this case */ |
| struct posix_ace_state_array *users; |
| struct posix_ace_state_array *groups; |
| }; |
| |
| static int |
| init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt) |
| { |
| int alloc; |
| |
| memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state)); |
| state->empty = 1; |
| /* |
| * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct |
| * named user or group, but we don't no which, so we allocate |
| * enough space for either: |
| */ |
| alloc = sizeof(struct posix_ace_state_array) |
| + cnt*sizeof(struct posix_user_ace_state); |
| state->users = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!state->users) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| state->groups = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!state->groups) { |
| kfree(state->users); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| free_state(struct posix_acl_state *state) { |
| kfree(state->users); |
| kfree(state->groups); |
| } |
| |
| static inline void add_to_mask(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state *astate) |
| { |
| state->mask.allow |= astate->allow; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Certain bits (SYNCHRONIZE, DELETE, WRITE_OWNER, READ/WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, |
| * READ_ATTRIBUTES, READ_ACL) are currently unenforceable and don't translate |
| * to traditional read/write/execute permissions. |
| * |
| * It's problematic to reject acls that use certain mode bits, because it |
| * places the burden on users to learn the rules about which bits one |
| * particular server sets, without giving the user a lot of help--we return an |
| * error that could mean any number of different things. To make matters |
| * worse, the problematic bits might be introduced by some application that's |
| * automatically mapping from some other acl model. |
| * |
| * So wherever possible we accept anything, possibly erring on the side of |
| * denying more permissions than necessary. |
| * |
| * However we do reject *explicit* DENY's of a few bits representing |
| * permissions we could never deny: |
| */ |
| |
| static inline int check_deny(u32 mask, int isowner) |
| { |
| if (mask & (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (!isowner) |
| return 0; |
| if (mask & (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static struct posix_acl * |
| posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| struct posix_acl_entry *pace; |
| struct posix_acl *pacl; |
| int nace; |
| int i, error = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * ACLs with no ACEs are treated differently in the inheritable |
| * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, |
| * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. |
| */ |
| if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * When there are no effective ACEs, the following will end |
| * up setting a 3-element effective posix ACL with all |
| * permissions zero. |
| */ |
| nace = 4 + state->users->n + state->groups->n; |
| pacl = posix_acl_alloc(nace, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!pacl) |
| return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
| |
| pace = pacl->a_entries; |
| pace->e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ; |
| error = check_deny(state->owner.deny, 1); |
| if (error) |
| goto out_err; |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(state->owner.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); |
| |
| for (i=0; i < state->users->n; i++) { |
| pace++; |
| pace->e_tag = ACL_USER; |
| error = check_deny(state->users->aces[i].perms.deny, 0); |
| if (error) |
| goto out_err; |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(state->users->aces[i].perms.allow, |
| &pace->e_perm, flags); |
| pace->e_uid = state->users->aces[i].uid; |
| add_to_mask(state, &state->users->aces[i].perms); |
| } |
| |
| pace++; |
| pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ; |
| error = check_deny(state->group.deny, 0); |
| if (error) |
| goto out_err; |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(state->group.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); |
| add_to_mask(state, &state->group); |
| |
| for (i=0; i < state->groups->n; i++) { |
| pace++; |
| pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP; |
| error = check_deny(state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny, 0); |
| if (error) |
| goto out_err; |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(state->groups->aces[i].perms.allow, |
| &pace->e_perm, flags); |
| pace->e_gid = state->groups->aces[i].gid; |
| add_to_mask(state, &state->groups->aces[i].perms); |
| } |
| |
| pace++; |
| pace->e_tag = ACL_MASK; |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(state->mask.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); |
| |
| pace++; |
| pace->e_tag = ACL_OTHER; |
| error = check_deny(state->other.deny, 0); |
| if (error) |
| goto out_err; |
| low_mode_from_nfs4(state->other.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); |
| |
| return pacl; |
| out_err: |
| posix_acl_release(pacl); |
| return ERR_PTR(error); |
| } |
| |
| static inline void allow_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask) |
| { |
| /* Allow all bits in the mask not already denied: */ |
| astate->allow |= mask & ~astate->deny; |
| } |
| |
| static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask) |
| { |
| /* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */ |
| astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow; |
| } |
| |
| static int find_uid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kuid_t uid) |
| { |
| struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->users; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++) |
| if (uid_eq(a->aces[i].uid, uid)) |
| return i; |
| /* Not found: */ |
| a->n++; |
| a->aces[i].uid = uid; |
| a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow; |
| a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny; |
| |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| static int find_gid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kgid_t gid) |
| { |
| struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->groups; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++) |
| if (gid_eq(a->aces[i].gid, gid)) |
| return i; |
| /* Not found: */ |
| a->n++; |
| a->aces[i].gid = gid; |
| a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow; |
| a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny; |
| |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| static void deny_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i=0; i < a->n; i++) |
| deny_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask); |
| } |
| |
| static void allow_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i=0; i < a->n; i++) |
| allow_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask); |
| } |
| |
| static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, |
| struct nfs4_ace *ace) |
| { |
| u32 mask = ace->access_mask; |
| int i; |
| |
| state->empty = 0; |
| |
| switch (ace2type(ace)) { |
| case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { |
| allow_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| } else { |
| deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| } |
| break; |
| case ACL_USER: |
| i = find_uid(state, ace->who_uid); |
| if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { |
| allow_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask); |
| } else { |
| deny_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask); |
| mask = state->users->aces[i].perms.deny; |
| deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| } |
| break; |
| case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { |
| allow_bits(&state->group, mask); |
| } else { |
| deny_bits(&state->group, mask); |
| mask = state->group.deny; |
| deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask); |
| deny_bits_array(state->users, mask); |
| deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask); |
| } |
| break; |
| case ACL_GROUP: |
| i = find_gid(state, ace->who_gid); |
| if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { |
| allow_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask); |
| } else { |
| deny_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask); |
| mask = state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny; |
| deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| deny_bits(&state->group, mask); |
| deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask); |
| deny_bits_array(state->users, mask); |
| deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask); |
| } |
| break; |
| case ACL_OTHER: |
| if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { |
| allow_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| allow_bits(&state->group, mask); |
| allow_bits(&state->other, mask); |
| allow_bits(&state->everyone, mask); |
| allow_bits_array(state->users, mask); |
| allow_bits_array(state->groups, mask); |
| } else { |
| deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); |
| deny_bits(&state->group, mask); |
| deny_bits(&state->other, mask); |
| deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask); |
| deny_bits_array(state->users, mask); |
| deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, |
| struct posix_acl **pacl, struct posix_acl **dpacl, |
| unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| struct posix_acl_state effective_acl_state, default_acl_state; |
| struct nfs4_ace *ace; |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = init_state(&effective_acl_state, acl->naces); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| ret = init_state(&default_acl_state, acl->naces); |
| if (ret) |
| goto out_estate; |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| for (ace = acl->aces; ace < acl->aces + acl->naces; ace++) { |
| if (ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE && |
| ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE) |
| goto out_dstate; |
| if (ace->flag & ~NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS) |
| goto out_dstate; |
| if ((ace->flag & NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS) == 0) { |
| process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!(flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)) |
| goto out_dstate; |
| /* |
| * Note that when only one of FILE_INHERIT or DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
| * is set, we're effectively turning on the other. That's OK, |
| * according to rfc 3530. |
| */ |
| process_one_v4_ace(&default_acl_state, ace); |
| |
| if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)) |
| process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); |
| } |
| *pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags); |
| if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl); |
| *pacl = NULL; |
| goto out_dstate; |
| } |
| *dpacl = posix_state_to_acl(&default_acl_state, |
| flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); |
| if (IS_ERR(*dpacl)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(*dpacl); |
| *dpacl = NULL; |
| posix_acl_release(*pacl); |
| *pacl = NULL; |
| goto out_dstate; |
| } |
| sort_pacl(*pacl); |
| sort_pacl(*dpacl); |
| ret = 0; |
| out_dstate: |
| free_state(&default_acl_state); |
| out_estate: |
| free_state(&effective_acl_state); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| __be32 |
| nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, |
| struct nfs4_acl *acl) |
| { |
| __be32 error; |
| int host_error; |
| struct dentry *dentry; |
| struct inode *inode; |
| struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL; |
| unsigned int flags = 0; |
| |
| /* Get inode */ |
| error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_SATTR); |
| if (error) |
| return error; |
| |
| dentry = fhp->fh_dentry; |
| inode = dentry->d_inode; |
| |
| if (!inode->i_op->set_acl || !IS_POSIXACL(inode)) |
| return nfserr_attrnotsupp; |
| |
| if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) |
| flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR; |
| |
| host_error = nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(acl, &pacl, &dpacl, flags); |
| if (host_error == -EINVAL) |
| return nfserr_attrnotsupp; |
| if (host_error < 0) |
| goto out_nfserr; |
| |
| host_error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, pacl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); |
| if (host_error < 0) |
| goto out_release; |
| |
| if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { |
| host_error = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, dpacl, |
| ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); |
| } |
| |
| out_release: |
| posix_acl_release(pacl); |
| posix_acl_release(dpacl); |
| out_nfserr: |
| if (host_error == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| return nfserr_attrnotsupp; |
| else |
| return nfserrno(host_error); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static short |
| ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *ace) |
| { |
| switch (ace->whotype) { |
| case NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED: |
| return (ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP ? |
| ACL_GROUP : ACL_USER); |
| case NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER: |
| return ACL_USER_OBJ; |
| case NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP: |
| return ACL_GROUP_OBJ; |
| case NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE: |
| return ACL_OTHER; |
| } |
| BUG(); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| struct nfs4_acl * |
| nfs4_acl_new(int n) |
| { |
| struct nfs4_acl *acl; |
| |
| acl = kmalloc(sizeof(*acl) + n*sizeof(struct nfs4_ace), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (acl == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| acl->naces = 0; |
| return acl; |
| } |
| |
| static struct { |
| char *string; |
| int stringlen; |
| int type; |
| } s2t_map[] = { |
| { |
| .string = "OWNER@", |
| .stringlen = sizeof("OWNER@") - 1, |
| .type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER, |
| }, |
| { |
| .string = "GROUP@", |
| .stringlen = sizeof("GROUP@") - 1, |
| .type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP, |
| }, |
| { |
| .string = "EVERYONE@", |
| .stringlen = sizeof("EVERYONE@") - 1, |
| .type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE, |
| }, |
| }; |
| |
| int |
| nfs4_acl_get_whotype(char *p, u32 len) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) { |
| if (s2t_map[i].stringlen == len && |
| 0 == memcmp(s2t_map[i].string, p, len)) |
| return s2t_map[i].type; |
| } |
| return NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; |
| } |
| |
| __be32 nfs4_acl_write_who(int who, __be32 **p, int *len) |
| { |
| int i; |
| int bytes; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) { |
| if (s2t_map[i].type != who) |
| continue; |
| bytes = 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(s2t_map[i].stringlen) << 2); |
| if (bytes > *len) |
| return nfserr_resource; |
| *p = xdr_encode_opaque(*p, s2t_map[i].string, |
| s2t_map[i].stringlen); |
| *len -= bytes; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| WARN_ON_ONCE(1); |
| return -1; |
| } |